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According to statistics of the Federal Ministry of Works Nigeria (2012), total 
road network in Nigeria currently stands at approximately 195,000 Kilometers, 
with the Federal, State and Local Governments responsible for 22, 21 and 51 
percent of this network respectively.  In another report, The Central Bank of 
Nigeria (2011) also states that Nigeria needs to invest at least 100 billion 
dollars on roads in the next ten years. This study explores how social needs are 
realized within the public private participation (PPP) scheme in Nigeria. The 
study also situates public private partnership, in the Nigerian procurement 
and project operation context. The study’s objectives are achieved by revisiting 
the mechanism design paradigm (through reviewing the historical evolution of 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Nigeria) and its impact on social goals 
as developed by Tirole and Maskin (2008), within the Nigerian context. Data 
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on credit provided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP were used as 
proxies for PPP involvement from 1960 to 2010 although some years of data 
were missing. The method of estimation used included ordinary least squares, 
linear mixed effects models and seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
methods, which all allow for the investigation of relationships between a set of 
unrelated weakly exogenous variables, with the mixed effect method 
particularly suitable for iterative optimization processes. The findings show 
that cost implication concerns and the choice of the social function has an 
effect on PPP. It was also found that the electoral process which determines 
the social function mattered in the project selection stage and had significant 
effect on the PPP formation process. 
 
Keywords: PPPs, Social Needs, Project Delivery and Mechanism Design 
JEL Classification: L 14 
Introduction 
In this section we introduce the subject of our study. Lots of papers continue 
to emphasize the cost reduction advantages of involving the private sector in 
meeting social needs. While many studies have investigated the advantages 
of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in general, few have actually tried to 
capture variables of interest for further quantitative and empirical 
investigation as we do in this study. Few if any have tried to measure PPPs 
using data for domestic credit provided to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP. No study to the best of our knowledge has tried to also investigate 
the international context of private involvement on social goal realization in 
Nigeria as we do in this study.  
Since domestic claims on government as a percentage of GDP is 
continually on the increase in Nigeria (World Bank (2010) statistics), it is 
clear that government will continue to look for alternative ways to fund 
social projects such as roads, bridges and other cost implicative social needs 
due to budget limitations. Furthermore with increased strains in existing 
infrastructure owing to high population growth in Nigeria (World Bank 
Statistics, 2010), more pressure is on government to deliver public goods 
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(infrastructures) within a short space of time and to do so in an efficient 
manner.  
Afolabi (2011) and United Nation 2011 Report, also states that Nigeria 
needs to invest between 15.9 to 17 billion dollars approximately over the next 
decade in order to attain its goal of becoming one of the top twenty most 
competitive nations by 2020. As of now Nigeria only invests about 5 percent 
of her GDP yearly on infrastructure, while spending an average of 90 billion 
on consumption which are mainly on food related imports, electronics, 
automobiles and other household utilities. There is also strong evidence that 
budget financing is also very volatile and not likely to meet crucial 
infrastructure expenditure requirements. Furthermore, Nigeria’s import bill 
is also having a negative effect on its foreign reserves which have continually 
been on the decline since the third quarter of 20131. 
To address Nigeria’s infrastructural deficits, PPP serves as the 
appropriate mechanism that is designed for providing these social projects, 
particularly for a government charged with the responsibility of providing 
social goods but is faced with limited budgetary allocation. The Public 
private partnership provides a model (a mechanism or model designed for 
maximizing a social choice function) for public procurement based on long 
term relationship between the private and public sector for improved service 
delivery. It often involves a situation where the public sector (usually 
government), will involve the private sector (firms) in the delivery of service 
(which might be a public good or service). It is also a cost minimizing 
scheme that promotes efficiency and speedy delivery of public goods. 
While Public Private Partnership became popular in the early 1980s 
in Britain the actual inception date of PPP collaboration in Britain is 
unknown (Davis, Motte and Hall (2003)), evidence from World Bank 
Statistics show that private participation in public projects dates back to 
earlier times, however the nature of such participation were not clearly 
defined.  
This study investigates the effect of social needs on private public 
participation in Nigeria and secondly the effects of the choice of the social 
choice function on project efficiency in Nigeria. Data is obtained from the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, for a period of 51 years 
(1960 to 2010), although some years of data are missing. The method of 
                                                        
1 See CBN report 2013 
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estimation relied on is the ordinary least squares, maximum likelihood 
estimation (Linear Mixed Effect Estimation (LME)) and the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) estimation, which is an iterative process based 
on the premise that the sample moments will tend to that of the population 
distribution under the assumption that distribution normality holds. The 
rest of the paper is divided into the scope and objectives of study, review of 
literature, stylized facts on social needs and PPPs, theory and methodology, 
empirical analysis and results and finally the concluding sections. 
Scope and Objectives of the Study  
In this section we state the scope and objective of the study. The study 
revisits the mechanism design
2
 and Public Private Participation Paradigm 
and presents empirical evidence on the impact of budgetary constraint and 
the social choice function on Public Private Partnership in Nigeria, by 
investigating the practical implementation of the theory of mechanism 
design as proposed by Maskin (2008). The objectives of the study include: 
a) To determine the extent to which cost implications such as 
budgetary constraints drive PPP formation and frequency in the 
Nigeria social infrastructural development context 
b) To examine critically the impact of the PPPs on the social choice 
function in the Nigeria infrastructural development sector. 
c) To determine the extent to which social needs, project efficiency 
and private sector interest affect Public Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria. 
d) Finally to determine the effect of private and public sector interest 
on PPP formation and project Efficiency in Nigeria. 
History of Private Finance Initiative and PPP in Nigeria 
In this section we present a brief review on how the PFI process which has 
been modestly successful in the Oil sector is gradually being introduced as 
PPP in infrastructural development in Nigeria, arguing that PPP has in fact 
                                                        
2 Mechanism design- provides the platform through which social goals can be executed to obtain 
the desired outcome using PPP. Mechanism design can be defined as a game of two or more 
players (reverse game in most cases) with divergent interest whose interaction work out 
together towards the realization of the project or social outcome generally regarded as the social 
choice function which needs to be maximized. 
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been an ongoing thing in Nigeria but has been limited to the oil and gas 
sector. 
Private finance initiative (PFI) the earliest form of PPPs has been in 
existence in Nigeria since the 20th century although most of this 
collaboration had been in the upstream oil and gas exploration sector. 
However it was commonly referred to as the private finance initiative, one of 
the earliest of such public private venture was the granting of concessions to 
the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation owned by British National Simon 
Bergheim in 1906 for the exploration of oil in Nigeria.   
According to Obasi N.K. (2003) and Afolabi (2011) Simon Bergheim 
had previously made an argument based on his geological knowledge of the 
southern Nigeria terrain, that oil existed in southern Nigeria, the next year 
in 1907 the Southern Nigerian Colonial Government set up the Southern 
Nigerian Mining Regulation Ordinance of 1907 granting Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation sole monopoly. His death in 1913 six years after the first mining 
concession led to a delay in further oil exploration activity until the Shell D’ 
Arcy Oil company now known as the Royal Dutch Shell plc was granted sole 
concession to explore oil in Nigeria in 1937, drilling 13 bore holes in two 
years around the Owerri axis without any success of striking oil. Stalled by 
World War II further oil exploration activities were not carried out until 
1951.  
Oil was first struck in commercial quantity in 1956 in Oloibiri in 
present day Bayelsa State and also in Afam Rivers state in that same year.  
Massive construction of oil pipelines to Port-Harcourt commenced the same 
year with the first commercial exports from both oil wells taking place in 
1958. With the success of Shell Petroleum Company other mining 
concessions were granted, these included for instance the granting of 
mining concession to Mobil Oil Producing in Nigeria’s Sokoto basin, Benue 
trough and some fringes of the Niger Delta.  
After disappointments in striking oil in the Sokoto Basin and Benue 
Trough it moved to the Benin-Dahomey basin where it drilled four oil wells 
between 1959 and 1961 (Obasi, 2003). Independence in 1960 also led to 
intensive oil explorative activities, the sole rights of Shell were also 
withdrawn with Shell only retaining 50 percent of its concessions in the 
Niger-Delta region. It is important to highlight at this point that over the 
years with the memoranda of understanding signed with oil companies in 
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Nigeria, it can be clearly seen that private sector initiative were the concept 
that led to the success of initial oil exploration activities in Nigeria. 
 A list of other private finance initiative agreements signed with the 
Royal Dutch Shell plc as far back as the late 1960s include for instance the 
utilization of the Liquefied Natural Gas in electricity generation through the 
supply of gas to private companies in Aba and electricity generating plants 
in Ughelli (for the Ughelli gas power station) which was Owned by the then 
Electricity Company of Nigeria. In recent times Shell sale of gas currently 
exceeds 10 billion Naira yearly, with Shell currently supplying gas, to former 
government owned Utorgu and Alakiri power plants. 
 Other forms of such public private venture include the NNPC, 
Shell, Elf, Agip joint venture signed in April 1998 costing over 68 billion 
dollars for harnessing 18 million standard cubic feet of gas and reducing gas 
flaring through the Odidi Associated Gas gathering project from five flow 
stations (i.e. the Odidi 1, Odidi 2, Egwa 1, Egwa II and Batan flow stations) 
see Obasi N.K (2003) for further details.  
Today the success of these joint partnership is only been transferred 
to other sector of the Nigerian economy, particularly the socio 
infrastructural development sector. For instance, the Lekki-Epe 50km 
expressway upgrade, maintenance and expansion for instance is handled by 
the Lekki Concession Company, it uses the build operate and transfer 
method of infrastructural delivery (BOT), it is mandated to handle vital road 
infrastructure for the Lekki peninsular of Lagos, this concession is initially 
granted for a 30 year period.  
The second Niger Bridge construction has also been awarded as a 
concession using the Design Build Fund Operate and Transfer (DEBFOT) 
infrastructural delivery model with funding to be provided by the Federal 
Government and the World Bank with 40 billion Naira, coming from the 
SURE-P (Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme),  Federal 
funds and others funded through the private sector. Other projects include 
Tin Can island port operation concession between Five Star Logistics and 
the Federal Government Nigeria. 
All PPP projects at the Federal level are handled by the 
infrastructural Concession and Regulation Commission of Nigeria, the 
commission is responsible for all PPP awards and regulation, the list of 
sectors where they supervise infrastructural projects currently include power 
generation/transmission and distribution, building of roads bridges and 
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ports, railways construction, gas and petroleum infrastructure, health care 
facilities sectors etc see Afolabi (2011) for further discussions. 
Review of Literature 
 In this section we review past and current literature on the study. Hurwicz 
L. (1960) and Hurwicz and Reiter (2006) state that design problems are often 
associated with two factors, the goal and the mechanism for achieving the 
goal which is usually unknown. It also argues that it is a reverse game theory 
problem, since the goals which are the end results are often known but not 
the mechanism.  
Hurwicz (1960) also state some basic features of the game, which 
includes a case where the game designer chooses the game structure but 
does not inherit one and the fact that the game designer is only interested in 
the outcomes of the game. Hurwitz and Reiter (2006) also described 
mechanism design as a private information game in which one of the agents 
usually called the principal chooses the play offs structure of the game see 
also Harsanyi (1967). The agents in this structure receive secret information 
from the game structure containing relevant pay offs such as cost, quality, 
preferences etc. After this report the principal and agents will derive some 
defined utility. 
Hurwicz and Reiter (2006) also further insights into the game time 
extensively, stating that mechanism design game are characterized by the 
following; a structure where the principal commits to a mechanism      that 
has an outcome  , the agents report their type, e.g. possibly dishonestly or 
some type of portfolio and the mechanism is executed and the agents 
receive a payoff at        which is utility of the principal and possibly 
described as the optimal social choice.  
 Under this strategy in implementing social goals the designer will 
have to consider the following the designer i.  will design      that 
implements the social choice function  ii.  try to find the mechanism      
that maximizes some value criterion e.g infrastructure pro ects or 
procurement. The social choice function can now be defined as f     x        
Where f    is the social choice function and t    is the transfer function 
which is equal to x    which is the pro ect outcome that the principal 
induces the agent to pick through motivation or other forms of payoffs due 
to it transfer function and    is the optimal social choice from which the 
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principal derives his utility (or see Hurwitz and Reiter (2006) for further 
discussion) 
Lewis and Sappington (1988), Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and 
Laffont and Tirole (1989) all examine a reputation model where the extent of 
under-investment and cost overruns are function of length and the 
relationship between the principal and agents and state that while 
relationships might be a condition for the guarantee of appropriate 
investment issues of cost overruns such as changes in technology do not 
cause agency problems since they result to upgrading or downgrading cost 
simplification. However the issue of cost underestimation in order to secure 
contracts present challenges for the principal who might need to support 
the agent. 
Loeb and Magat (1979) study mechanism design and used it to 
examine cases of regulated contracts where there exist no social cost of 
leaving rent to agents thereby ignoring the social cost of public funds in 
their model. They also argue that it is necessary to award agents the whole 
net consumer surplus to a good investment.  
Sappington (1982) also study the regulated contracts and introduces 
the social cost of public funds which were neglected in the study by Loeb 
and Magat (1979). Other papers e.g. Baron and Myerson (1982) after 
studying the adverse selection problem intensively argue that when an agent 
cannot be observed the social optimal price an agent is allowed to charge 
often exceeds its Ramsey levels. 
Others such as Chiang (1998) also study the moral hazard problem 
and find that the power of incentive decreases by n-fold when the number of 
principal increases from 1 to n for a risk adverse agent. Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) discuss the adverse selection and moral hazard problem under a 
single model and state that a social optimal contract case makes the agent to 
invest efficiently and derive a positive rent while an inefficient case give an 
opposite outcome. 
Tsai (2007) state that the mechanism design literature often 
considers a linear payoff contract where there is a fixed payoff and 
performance- based payoff component. Allowing linear contracts to be 
replicated using two incentive schemes price cap and cost of services in 
regulated contracts. The study by Mathios and Rogers (1989) also study the 
effect of price cap and cost of services on average intra state telephone rates 
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and find that states that adopted the price cap strategy had a lower rate than 
those that adopted the cost of services strategy. 
This paper investigates the effect of the social choice (social needs) 
on PPP formation in Nigeria. It also investigated facts that affect the social 
choice function within the Nigeria public contracting scheme. Past Works 
such as Afolabi (2011) have only enumerated the advantages of PPP for 
project delivery by reviewing historical successes in Australia, the EU and 
North America. Few papers have attempted to study PPP within the private 
sector by including project development through the forms of private 
finance initiatives in the pre 1990s to recent times when PPP have now 
gained the required recognition as we do in this study. 
Stylized Facts on Needs and PPPs in Nigeria 
In this section we present trends and facts on PPP in Nigeria. Trends show 
that public private partnership in Nigeria actually gained momentum from 
the early 1980s and has suffered considerable setbacks since the late 1990s 
till date. 
 
Figure 1: Public Private Partnership Overtime 
Note: This is captured using the ratio of domestic credit provided to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP. It depicts the level of private sector involvement in the public procurement 
and infrastructural development sectors in Nigeria. 
There also appears to be increased partnerships from the late 2000s 
(2007 to be precise). This is largely attributable to the recent efforts by 
government to deliver on social goals and the increasing domestic claims on 
government, making government to act systematically to shrink its domestic 
debt profile. 
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Trends also show that public participation in social goal delivery has 
been high for Nigeria in general. With major decreases recorded only for the 
2007 global financial crisis period. Sharp increases are also noticeable for 
late 2000s till (2009 to 2012) date with increase in public allocation and 
growth driven spending. 
 
Figure 2: Public Involvement in Projects Overtime 
Note:  This depicts government spending in Nigeria as a percentage of GDP over time. It was used 
to depict government spending allocation for procurement and project execution purposes.   
 
Private participation in project execution is also gaining momentum 
particularly since the build transfer and operate strategy were beginning to 
gain grounds in the procurement and socio infrastructural development 
sector. This is largely driven by high returns on investment and ongoing 
engagement of private firms in maintenance and operation of socio 
infrastructural projects e.g. the Lekki-Epe express way completed in 2011 and 
operated by the Lekki Concession Company (LCC). 
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Figure 3: Private Participation in Projects Over Time 
Note:  This is the aggregate private capital outflow as a percentage of GDP. It depicts private 
firm’s potential to engage in capital intensive socio infrastructural development activities.  
 
Demand for social infrastructure (termed needs) is also on the 
increase with considerable decline in infrastructure over time. Nigeria 
continues to experience considerable decline in infrastructure depicting a 
strong increase in social needs and poor delivery in public procurement and 
project execution procedure policy of the Nigeria government. Increased 
need also means increased demands on government to fulfill electoral 
promises and live up to its expectations of providing public goods for the 
country’s citizens. 
 
Figure 4: Social Infrastructural Quality in Nigeria Overtime 
Note:  This depicts the state of infrastructure overtime in Nigeria. It currently depicts 
infrastructural decadence and unavailability showing how the quality of infrastructure has 
deteriorated owing to years of neglect by government and development agencies. 
 
Social spending is also affected by shrinking budgetary allocation 
and other issues of inflation and exchange rates related problems, reducing 
the power of the Naira and further weaking the social goal realization 
effectiveness of the Nigerian public procurement agencies. 
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Figure 5: Budget Allocation Availability for Socio Development in Years 
Note: Signs of budgetary strains are clearly noticeable overtime in the Nigeria financial allocation 
for socio infrastructural development. This is probably attributable to increased claims on 
government as a percentage of its total gross earnings making government to have less and less 
revenue for capital expenditure after debt servicing. 
 
There also appears to be significant improvement in project 
execution and efficiency, as shown below with recorded increases from the 
year 2000 till date. This is attributable to democratic governance and more 
transparency in the public bidding and contract award process. 
Time for signing memoranda of understanding is also getting 
shorter, as clearer definition and more experience of PPP is being gained less 
and less time appear to be needed to effect a PPP process, the implication of 
this is that less time to complete project in an efficient manner are under 
way since MOUs no longer pose a source of delay for public and private 
agencies considering going into such partnerships. 
 
 
Figure 6: Efficiency in Project Execution over Years 
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Note: Efficiency in project execution is also on the increase with noticeable increases for late 
1990s to 2007. A decrease in the 2000s (i.e. from 2008) is attributable high inflationary trends 
inadequate transparency in contract awards, high level of uncertainty in the Nigeria business 
environment and contract under-estimation in the Nigerian bidding process making contractor to 
find it difficult to deliver projects as at when due. 
 
 
Figure 7: Public Private Composition of Memoranda Overtime in Nigeria 
Note: The ratio of private to public interest is also increasing making private sector participation 
appears to be on the increase, more incentive for private firms also mean they are less averse to 
signing MOUs for the PPP process in general. Issues of more understanding and increasing 
benefits of the PPP process is also reducing delays in MOUs signing making MOUs quality to be 
steadily on the increase presently. 
 
Sources of Data 
All data for Nigeria were obtained from the World Development Indicator of 
the World Bank for the period of 1960 to 2010 a period of 52 years.  
 
Table 1: List of Variables and Description 
Variables Sources Abbreviations  Description 
Public Privates 
Partnerships 
World 
Bank Data 
PPP Aggregate domestic credit in 
USD provided to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP 
    
Infrastructure/Capita  World 
Bank Data 
Needs Road length in kilometers as 
a percentage of population 
    Budget Constraint World 
Bank Data 
BC Aggregate claims on 
government as a percentage 
of GDP 
    
Private Participation World 
Bank Data 
PP private capital outflow as a 
percentage of GDP 
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Private Sector Interest  World 
Bank Data 
PSI Aggregate  private sector net 
outflow in constant USD 
    
Government Interest World 
Bank Data 
GI Government  spending as a 
percentage of GDP over time 
Memorandum of 
Understanding  
World 
Bank Data 
MOU Percentage private to public 
sector interest in project 
executed overtime measured 
using private sector outflow 
over government spending 
overtime. 
Liquidity to Liability Ratio World 
Bank Data 
LLR Government liquidity to 
liability ratio 
Delivery Cost World 
Bank Data 
DEC PPP delivery cost (PPP times 
inflation) 
Project Delivery World 
Bank Data 
PRJ Country specific budgetary 
allocation times possible 
constraints to project delivery 
such inflation 
Project Efficiency World 
Bank Data 
EFF Institutional  measures which 
account for regulated 
contracts and oversight of the 
contract award, supervision 
and quality assurance 
standards 
    
    Foreign Investment in PPP World 
Bank Data 
FORIN Foreign Investment Inflow as 
a percentage of GDP 
 
Note: All data are obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) data and the World Bank world 
development indicator (WDI) data unless otherwise stated. The abbreviation USD represents 
United States Dollars. We also acknowledge the use of Datamarket of Iceland to access World 
Bank Statistics. 
 
PPP is the aggregate domestic credit provided to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP, budget constraint is also the aggregate claims on 
government as a percentage of GDP, and project efficiency was captured 
using institutional measures which account for regulated contracts and 
oversight of the contract award, supervision and quality assurance 
standards.  
Private participation in projects was measured using private capital 
outflow as a percentage of GDP. Private sector interest is also aggregate 
private sector net outflow in constant US dollars. While MOU is captured as 
the percentage of private to public sector interest in project executed 
overtime which was measured using percentage of private sector outflow to 
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public participation overtime. Delivery cost is the project delivery cost 
which could be a function of project construction overtime that is obtained 
by multiplying PPP cost times inflation.  All data are obtained from the 
Central Bank of Nigeria statistics and the World Bank data unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
Table2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations        Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP)  52 20.46 13.02 -1.60 49.90 
Budget Constraint 52 6.38 9.74 -12.66 28.02 
Private Sector Participation 52 2.43 2.31 -1.15 8.50 
Private Sector Interest 52 4.96 2.47 0.32 11.06 
Government (Public) Interest 52 5.71 8.25 2.00 4.90 
Needs (Social Goal) 52 216.16 43 124.1 297.1 
Project Efficiency  52 0.39 0.23 0.19 1.18 
Delivery Cost 52 41.35 54.99 0.71 153.90 
Memorandum of Understanding 52 1.33 2.02 -3.60 6.70 
 
Source: Authors compilation (from WDI dataset of the World Bank and other sources) 
 
Theory and Methodology 
In this section we discuss the theory and method used in the study. There is 
currently little or no empirical work on public private partnership (PPPs), 
few if any exist where public private partnerships (PPP) has been 
implemented using data. In this study we make a case for PPP by drawing on 
activities of private finance initiatives (PFIs) as explained by Obasi N. (2003) 
and Afolabi (2011) in Nigeria since the 1930s.Since data is only available from 
the early 1960s, we were compelled to extrapolate data for about three years. 
In explaining the awards of contracts it will be worthy to state that while 
agents (private sector) should be supervised for efficiency, the principal 
(government) is also likely to be bedeviled by renting seeking official who 
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implement its goals which could affect the bidding or concession process 
making the contract system to have a lot of hidden information. Based on 
these, we can therefore state that: 
 The PPP formation process will be a function of budget constraints 
which will force the principal (government) to seek some alternative 
source of funding social projects 
 Social goals might in fact not be fully addressed using the PPP as a 
mechanism with government rent seeking officials weakening the 
bidding and concession process resulting to poor working relations. 
 Finally social needs will also be a function of budget constraints and 
will have cost implications due stringency of funds forcing the 
principal government in this case to seek for private partnership in 
realization of social goals to stem wastages. 
 Finally social goals will also be determined by mechanical design for 
social goal realization which will be a function of many hidden 
behavior of both the agent and the principals official type. 
We identify all major factors that might affect the PPP formation 
process and those that will affect the provision of social needs and argue 
critically that both PPP and social needs will depend on these critical 
factors. The theory presented is one in which public private partnership will 
depend on a host of factors that include: government budget constraint 
(BC), social needs (SC), project delivery cost (DEC), private participation 
(PP), private sector interest (PSI), government interest (GI), memorandum 
of understanding (MOU), and project efficiency (EFF). In other instances, 
we include liquidity to liability as a proxy for PPPs and expect to obtain the 
same results.  
We also evaluate the effect of PPP on the social choice function in 
this case social needs to determine if PPP was actually optimizing the social 
choice function which we argue to be the goal in the provision of social 
infrastructure. Therefore PPP will be a function of budget constraint (BC), 
social needs (SC), project delivery cost (DEC), private participation (PP), 
private sector interest (PSI), government interest (GI),  memorandum of 
understanding (MOU), and project efficiency (EFF) which can be expressed 
below as  
                              PPP f (BC, SC, DEC, PP, PSI, GI, MOU, EFF) 
PPP can now be expressed as a decreasing function of six factors 
which include social needs   SC≤ 0 , cost of delivery or delivery cost  DEC≤ 
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0 , private sector interest  PSI≤ 0 , government interest  GI≤ 0 , 
memorandum of understanding  MOU≤ 0 , and pro ect efficiency (EFF ) and 
an increasing function of budget constraint  BC ≥ 0 . 
And social needs (SC) will be a decreasing function of budget 
constraint  BC≤ 0 , public private partnerships  PPP≤ 0 , pro ect delivery 
cost  DEC≤ 0 , government interest  GI≤ 0 , memorandum of understanding 
 MOU≤ 0 , and pro ect efficiency  EFF ≤ 0  and an increasing function of 
private participation  PP≥ 0  and private sector interest  PSI≥ 0 . 
                         SC f (PPP, BC, DEC, PP, PSI, GI, MOU, EFF) 
Social choice i.e. Needs (SC) can also now be expressed as a 
decreasing function of budget constraint  BC≤ 0 , public private 
partnerships  PPP ≤ 0 , cost of delivery or delivery cost  DEC≤ 0 , 
government interest  GI≤ 0 , memorandum of understanding  MOU≤ 0 , 
and project efficiency (EFF ). 
The first set of model to be estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and linear mixed effect optimization estimation (LME) will now be 
expressed below while OLS will produce efficient estimates once the 
classical assumption of the linear regression model hold. Linear mixed effect 
estimation method allows us to find relationship between a set of unrelated 
variables. 
 
                                             =         +            
                                            =         +             
 
We also write the equation for the simultaneous equation model 
estimated in equations 3 and 4, estimated using the seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation method which is based on the premise that solving 
two equations simultaneously will produce consistent and reliable estimates 
since their error interact with one another thereby minimizing bias.  
 
                                            =         +             
                                        
 
=         +             
 
In the linear model in equations 1 and 2 and the simultaneous 
equations model in 3 and 4 we include the variable year to capture year 
effect where    is the set of other exogenous variables in each case listed in 
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the model specification. We do not believe that the above stated model will 
be mis-specified since we also take the first difference of all explanatory 
variables and state the public private partnerships and social needs will 
depend on our list of exogenous variables from past periods since we do not 
expect immediate factors to affect both of them allowing us to account for 
multi-co linearity and autocorrelation in variables (however we only account 
for just one lag). The variable year accounts for annual changes in 
government concession regulations and contract bidding process that might 
affect PPP in years and it also accounts for changes in public goods utility 
which we describe by social needs in years which will affect demand for 
public projects. 
Empirical Analysis, Results and Discussions 
In this section we argue intuitively why the PPP formation process and 
social goal realization are a function of budget constraint and the PPP 
design process and present the results of the regressions and finally 
discussion on the implications of these results for the PPP process and social 
needs (government optimal social choice).   
We present a logical argument by stating an ideal situation where 
government attempts to address social needs by executing projects through 
its public works department and finds that as time goes by rent seeking 
officials begin to drive up cost of project execution. It then sets up a bidding 
process due to the fact that overtime its liquidity liability ratio has increased 
significantly, in an attempt to seek alternative methods of project financing 
and maintenance through private partnership where efficiency is likely to be 
derived from the private sector profit maximization tendencies, to stem 
wastages and result to efficient allocation of limited resources.  
The results are presented in tables 3 to 6 the results of the ordinary 
least squares (OLS), linear mixed effect (LME) and the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimates are all the same in tables 3 to 5. Budget 
constraint was forcing government to private help in the social goal 
attainment. The two measures for budget constraint aggregate claims on 
government and liquidity to liability ratio were having a positive effect on 
PPP see Table 3. Needs were found to be having a negative effect on the PPP 
formation process.  
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This was likely due to the time of setting up a partnership needs 
were not likely to be met due to bureaucracy surrounding the PPP formation 
process see Table 3. Project efficiency is also another factor that might affect 
the PPP formation process efficiency in executing projects was also a 
concern to government since private sector firms were probably profit 
maximizing.  
PPPs were also found to have a negative effect on social goals in 
Nigeria depicting the method of the design were weak and were probably 
not in public interest. Finally in Table 6 the results are presented for the 
SUR estimation using three different measures of capital which depict 
government capital burden and one which depicts foreign investment into 
Nigeria particularly for infrastructural development. Results show that 
foreign investment had no effect on PPP formation and were not driving 
infrastructural development in the Country. Private partnership was also 
found to encourage PPP and had a positive effect on needs. Government 
interests were found to have a negative effect on PPPs and needs see table 6. 
PPP was also probably being affected by other factors since the variable year 
was not significant in some instance for the PPP regression see Tables 3 to 6 
implying that there are other factors such as government procurement 
policy and it indigenization policy that were affecting the PPP process that 
our model failed to capture which is a major limitation of the study. 
All the set objectives of the study are realized: 
a) It was found that cost implications such as budgetary constraints 
which include increased claims on government were driving PPP 
formation and frequency (positively) in the Nigeria social 
infrastructural development context 
b) It was also found that the PPP process was having a negative effect 
on the social needs in the Nigeria infrastructural development 
sector depicting that project delivery through PPP, were probably 
slow. 
c) Social needs and project efficiency were having negative effect on 
PPPs, probably making the MOUs design longer with the inclusion 
of clauses of stringent oversight and the demand for high quality 
project rollout at minimal cost. Private sector partnership was also 
having a positive effect on the PPP formation process. 
d) Finally there were no evidence of the effect of private sector interest 
on PPP formation and efficiency however government interests had 
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a negative effect probably due to rent seeking government officials 
handling the bidding and concession process. 
 
Table 3: Impact of Impact of Budget Constraint on the PPP Formation 
Process 
 1 
(OLS) 
2 
(LME) 
3 
(SUR) 
Variables PPPs PPPs PPPs 
    
Budget Constraint (claims on government) 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) 
Private Participation  -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.54) 
Private Sector Interest 0.55 0.55 0.55 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.49) 
Government Interest -6.08 -6.08 -6.08 
 (1.44) (1.44) (1.25) 
Social Needs -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Efficiency  -9.66 -9.66 -9.66 
 (6.85) (6.85) (5.93) 
MOU 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 (1.28) (1.28) (1.11) 
Foreign Investment  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Year Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Observations 40 40 40 
R-squared 0.905   
 
Table 3 presents the results of the impact of budget stringency (aggregate claims on government 
as a percentage of GDP) on PPP formation using ordinary least squares (OLS), linear mixed effect 
regression (LME) and seemingly unrelated regression respectively (SUR). All standard errors are 
in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 depicting 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels 
respectively. 
 
Table 4: Impact of Liquidity to Liability Ration on the PPP Formation 
Process 
 1 
(OLS) 
2 
(LME) 
3 
(SUR) 
Variables PPPs PPPs PPPs 
    
Liquidity to liability Ratio 0.67** 0.66** 0.66*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.255) 
Private Participation 1.49* 1.49* 1.49** 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.69) 
Private Sector Interest -1.44* -1.44* -1.44** 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.70) 
Government Interest  -3.13 -3.13 -3.13 
 (1.46) (1.46) (1.29) 
Social Needs  -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.252) 
Efficiency  -44.71*** -44.71*** -44.71*** 
 (14.32) (14.32) (12.61) 
Foreign Investment 0.12 0.12 0.12* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Year Effect  No No No 
Observations 40 40 40 
R-squared 0.75   
 
Table 4 presents the results of the impact of budget stringency (government liquidity to liability 
ratio a different measure of budget constraint with the results being the same depicting that the 
results are robust and our model not mis-specified) on PPP formation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS), linear mixed effect regression (LME) and seemingly unrelated regression 
respectively (SUR). All standard errors are in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
depicting 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
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  Table 5: Impact of PPP on Needs 
 1 
(OLS) 
2 
(LME) 
3 
(SUR) 
Variables Need  Need  Need  
    
Public Private Partnerships PPP -0.41** -0.41*** -0.41*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
Foreign Investment 0.12 0.12 0.12* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Private Participation  2.34** 2.34** 2.34** 
 (1.11) (1.11) (0.96) 
Private Sector Interest  2.55*** 2.55*** 2.55*** 
 (0.82) (0.82) (0.71) 
Government Interest  -4.75* -4.75* -4.75** 
 (2.53) (2.53) (2.19) 
Memorandum of Understanding  -5.50** -5.50** -5.50*** 
 (2.22) (2.22) (1.92) 
Project delivery  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cost of Completing Projects -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 40 40 40 
R-squared 0.96   
 
Table 5 presents the results of the impact of PPP on needs (the optimized social choice function) 
using ordinary least squares (OLS), linear mixed effect regression (LME) and seemingly unrelated 
regression respectively (SUR). All standard errors are in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 depicting 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
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Table 6: Foreign Interest Effect on The PPP formation Process and Social 
Goals Realization 
 1 
(SUR) 
2 
(SUR) 
3 
(SUR) 
4 
(SUR) 
5 
(SUR) 
6 
(SUR) 
Variables PPPs Needs PPPs Needs  PPPs Needs 
       
Budget Constraint 1.26*** 1.74***     
 (0.15) (0.29)     
Liquidity/ Liability Ratio   0.83*** -0.84***   
   (0.20) (0.24)   
       
Foreign Interest      0.11 0.12 
     (0.07) (0.07) 
Private Participation -0.02 0.50 1.34* 2.77*** 2.996*** 3.02*** 
 (0.62) (1.02) (0.77) (0.88) (0.85) (0.95) 
Private Sector Interest  0.85 2.23*** -1.67*** 2.07*** -1.11 1.95*** 
 (0.52) (0.72) (0.64) (0.74) (0.74) (0.70) 
Government Interest -1.32 -2.61 -1.66 -5.36** -4.94** -5.91*** 
 (1.50) (2.33) (2.15) (2.24) (2.24) (2.18) 
Social Need -0.54***  -0.04  -0.74***  
 (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.14)  
Efficiency  -0.86  -25.27***  -31.37***  
 (5.41)  (8.81)  (8.95)  
MOU 0.46 -0.57 -1.59 -5.85*** -5.51*** -6.86*** 
 (1.34) (2.21) (1.99) (2.03) (1.90) (1.89) 
Project Delivery  -0.01 -0.01 0.003 0.004 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PPP  -1.35***  0.05  -0.56*** 
  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
Delivery Cost   -0.005  -0.01  -0.10 
  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
       
Year Effect Yes  Yes  No Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Observations 48 48 46 46 40 40 
R-squared 0.86 0.97 0.78 0.97 0.67 0.96 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the impact of PPP on needs (the optimized social choice function) 
and the impact of budget stringency on PPP formation. The effect of foreign investment in the 
infrastructure sector were also evaluated on needs and the PPP process using ordinary least 
squares (OLS), linear mixed effect regression (LME) and seemingly unrelated regression 
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respectively (SUR). All standard errors are in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
depicting 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Conclusions 
PPPs were found to be currently driven by budget limitations for social 
project execution, It was also found that due to enormity of social needs 
which have to be met in Nigeria, and since the PPP formation process takes 
time, needs were probably reducing the use of PPP in project execution in 
Nigeria. Due to need to satisfy electoral demands the PPP formation process 
were probably being affected since it takes time causing needs to have 
negative effect on PPP showing that the electoral process mattered in PPP 
design. 
  PPPs were also found to need efforts in the planning stages since 
poor planned and designed projects will lead to non-attainment of social 
goals, which also resulted to PPP having a negative effect on social needs in 
Nigeria. The implications of our results are that the PPP process in Nigeria 
were generally not well implemented and were not having positive effect on 
social goal attainment also the MOUs surrounding PPPs were probably weak 
and were exerting negative effects on PPPs and on the provision of social 
needs see Table 6.  
The findings support past work by Lewis (1986), Hart and 
Holmstrom (1987) and Laffont and Tirole (1989) who all examine a 
reputation model where the extent of under-investment and cost overruns 
are function of length and the relationship between the principal and agents 
and state that while relationships might be a condition for the guarantee of 
appropriate investment issues of cost overruns such as changes in 
technology which they state do not cause agency problems are also 
important, since they result to upgrading or downgrading cost simplification 
and state that the issue of cost underestimation in order to secure contracts 
present challenges for the principal who might need to support the agent. 
This was true since how efficiently project are executed will depend on cost 
factors, our results show that project efficiency had a negative effect on PPPs 
depicting that firms were probably under reporting cost in the bidding 
stage. The policy implication of the study is that more transparency in the 
bidding and public concession process will be required to make PPPs live up 
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to the expectations of the society and finally managing projects effectively, 
could also improve social goal attainment in a significant manner. 
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